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Abstract
All non-trivial software systems suffer from unanticipated production
failures. However, those systems are passive with respect to failures and
do not take advantage of them in order to improve their future behavior:
they simply wait for them to happen and trigger hard-coded failure re-
covery strategies. Instead, I propose a new paradigm in which software
systems learn from their own failures. By using an advanced monitoring
system they have a constant awareness of their own state and health.
They are designed in order to automatically explore alternative recov-
ery strategies inferred from past successful and failed executions. Their
recovery capabilities are assessed by self-injection of controlled failures;
this process produces knowledge in prevision of future unanticipated fail-
ures.
1 Introduction
All non-trivial software systems suffer from unanticipated production failures.
For instance, on March 12 2012, the Mozilla Firefox web browser has crashed
270455 times. A software failure is commonly defined as an output that does
not correspond to the user’s expectations [3]. In the Mozilla Firefox example,
the failure is that the program closes (actual behavior) instead of rendering
the requested web page (expected behavior). A failure is caused by a fault
in the code or an unexpected environmental condition [3]. The classical view
on software failures is to combat them with techniques for: detecting faults
using static and dynamic software analysis; proving the absence of certain
faults; and improving the development processes and tools to prevent the
introduction of faults. Those research threads yielded fundamental advances
in software engineering but failed to eradicate software failures. In this paper,
I take a ground-breaking perspective on this topic: instead of being passive
with respect to production failures, software systems should actively monitor,
exploit and learn from them.
The Computing World Today Let us take the story of Pat, working on her
manuscript using a text processing application. On June 26, 2014, a software
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failure in her text processing document results in complete loss of the last four
weeks of writing. Pat’s failure is useless: the conditions in which the failure
happened are unknown, the fact that Pat’s failure also happened on Bob and
Alice’s machines is not shared, the reason for which the recovery planned by
the developer failed is lost.
The Computing World Tomorrow All text processors of the same version
would collect and share execution information. When Pat’s failure occurs,
detailed information is sent back to an observation server running diagnosis
algorithms. The server identifies a key similarity between 17 failures. The di-
agnosis algorithms analyze the data and triggers fine-grain monitoring. After
having collected 5 more failures and the associated detailed execution infor-
mation, the server runs a learning algorithm that identifies that the code vari-
able “plugin” is responsible for the failure. The server then synthesizes a code
change as a solution. To validate the change, the system proactively injects the
same failure on Alice’s machine and validates that the inferred solution avoids
the severe data loss. The failure of user Pat is now part of in a global adaptive
and collaborative learning process, the software system (the text processor)
gets better after the occurrence of the failure. Pat’s failure has become useful.
My vision is that software systems can learn from their own failures,
as humans do. By “learning”, self-identifying execution and environmental
patterns in which the failures occur and self-synthesizing memory and code
changes so that the failures become harmless. Learning is an active process:
software systems must constantly assess whether the learned healing capa-
bilities succeed, must proactively explore alternative recovery strategies, for
instance using self-injection of failures.
Recent research suggests that automatically fixing software failures is pos-
sible [11]. Weimer et al. [20], Zeller et al. [6] and others have proposed
algorithms that generate valid patches to automatically repair failure scenar-
ios. Those systems have a fundamental limitation: they work offline and not
in production.
To realize my vision, I propose three research directions:
• Designing new adaptive and collaborative software monitoring systems.
They will provide the input data to the learning and inference algo-
rithms, about the software executions and failures across multiple ma-
chines.
• Inventing resourceful dynamic repair techniques that learn to self-improve.
They will employ specification mining and code synthesis for achieving
runtime adaptive failure recovery and exploring the recovery space.
• Characterizing proactive perturbation of software systems with injected
failures. When failures become useful, one can trigger controlled failures
in production for the system to learn and improve its runtime knowledge
and consciousness of its environment and recovery capabilities.
2
2 State of the Art
The vision is close to the research on self-healing software [9, 8], which has
also been referred to as software immune systems [16]. Now, the literature
seems to prefer the term “automatic repair” (runtime repair, dynamic repair)
[11].
Research on automatic software repair and self-healing systems has started
in years 2000. It can be decomposed in two currents [11]. The first is called
“behavioral repair” concerns repair of the system code. A famous technique
is Genprog [20]. It consists of generating a patch so as to make a failing test
case passing. It employs different code manipulation techniques and a kind
of genetic optimization to drive the repair process. Very recent advances in
this active field include DirectFix [10]. Genprog and Directfix run offline, they
do not consider production failures and only work on failures for which one
failing test case has been written. While the code manipulation techniques
of Genprog are powerful, it misses the essential capability to be executed in
production.
The second current of automatic software repair consists of changing the
execution state at runtime. As early as 1980, Taylor and colleagues [19] in-
troduced “robust data structures” which are able to repair their own state at
runtime. More recently, Demsky and Rinard [7] proposed a similar approach
for data structure repair [7]. Also much related, Perkins et al.’s ClearView [14]
is a production system. Plugged into legacy x86 software, it mines runtime in-
variants on CPU registers and restores those invariants upon unanticipated
failures. This is a strong limitation: previous experiments with reasoning on
unanticipated production failures [4] has shown that real-life recovery goes
far beyond invariants on CPU registers.
The closest research on this topic is by Sidoroglou et al. [15]. They have
devised a system, called Assure, which is able to recover from unanticipated
failures using a technique called “error virtualization”. Error virtualization
consists of repurposing failure handling-code for a larger class of failures. For
instance, if some code has been written for handling the case where a file
does not exist, it can be repurposed for handling the case where the file is not
readable. Assure aims at handling unanticipated failures but it considers all
failures in isolation. What is missing in Assure is to link failures together, to
reason about the fact that many failures have the same cause, to understand
why some recovery attempts succeed while others fail.
More fundamentally, all those systems are passive with respect to failures,
they just wait for failures to happen. I propose to explore a novel direction:
software systems must become active, as in “active learning”. They can be
active with respect to failures in a number of promising manners: by self-
injecting failures to self-assess the recovery capability and by exploring alter-
native recovery strategies to explore the recovery space.
Fault injection can be casted in a broader concept of execution perturba-
tion. Ammann and Knight’s “data diversity” [2] consists of changing values
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Figure 1: At runtime in production, the software system is augmented with
a collaborative monitoring module, a resourceful recovery module and a per-
turbation module. All together, they form software that learns from its own
failures.
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at runtime so as to complete a computation in the presence of failures. Tang
and colleagues showed that execution perturbation of floating point programs
is an efficient technique to uncover failures [18]. However, nobody has ever
studied automatic execution perturbation in production for constantly assess-
ing recovery capabilities and exploring the recovery space.
3 Research Agenda
To construct software that learns from its own failures, there are three axes
to take into account. First, software must become deeply aware of its own
state and health. This can be achieved through novel automated monitoring
systems. Second, software must be capable of changing and synthesizing its
own recovery code at runtime. This requires completely revisiting the way
recovery is handled. Third, once software has the capability to improve upon
failures, it becomes ready to proactively explore its reactions to new failures,
to proactively explore alternative new recovery strategies.
3.1 Future of Monitoring
Software that learns from its own failures needs to reason on its own internal
state, health and history. To do so, it needs to embed a monitoring system.
However, today’s monitoring systems are not able to give an accurate view of
the execution state. Let’s consider the following piece of code:
error = login(user, password, encryptionMethod);
if (error==true) {
log("error during login for user:"+ user);
}
The call to function log is a monitoring probe, it has been manually added
by a conscientious developer to keep a trace of login errors. Now assume that
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legitimate user “Bob” is not able to login due to a rare failure. The failure is
due to the encryption method that is used. To be able to diagnose the failure,
the system must understand that when the encryption method is “md5” it suc-
ceeds and when it is “sha1”, it fails. To do so the monitoring probe must look
like the following, which has not been foreseen by the developer log("error
during login: "+context(user, encryptionMethod)); .
Upon failures, the monitoring system must collect all relevant informa-
tion. One cannot only rely on manually added monitoring directives, because
they are doomed to be incomplete: either calls to the monitoring system are
missing, or not all variables are collected, as illustrated in the above example.
One can employ automatic injection of monitoring probes through meta-
programming, as shown in Figure 1. A monitoring system for software that
learn from its failures has to meet the following requirements. First, it collects
very fine grain monitoring data, up to the level of variables. This is possible be-
cause metaprogramming gives access to all elements of the code. Second, the
monitoring system shall be adaptive. For instance, in nominal mode, it only
collects the value of variable “user” in order to keep trace of all connections
in the system. Upon the first failure, it starts to collect the other variables that
are involved in the login process, so as to diagnose that the failure is due to
the wrong value of “encryptionMethod”. Third, the cost of monitoring (mem-
ory, disk, bandwidth) is dynamically controlled. For instance, if disk space
is limited, the monitoring system decides to only collect one out of two calls
to function “login”. This is a tradeoff between keeping the core functionali-
ties up and the speed of diagnosis. Fourth, monitoring must be collaborative.
The same failure happens on many machines running the same software ap-
plication. The failure information on machine x can be cross-compared with
the same failure happening on machine y. The comparison of similarities and
differences drives the diagnostic.
I envision a monitoring system that is adaptive, collaborative and
resource-aware. Nobody has ever put those three capabilities together.
When monitoring becomes fine-grained and collaborative, it may become
a threat to the privacy of the application’s user. Special care must be taken so
as to protect the end users’ privacy. Anonymization and sampling have to be
used so that no malicious attacker can exploit the system to track, spy or steal
the users.
Barriers: The resources taken by monitoring compete with the ones needed
for the code functionalities (disk, memory and bandwidth). Also, there is a
major size issue: there are thousands of machines that cooperate to share
monitoring data. This requires an architectural blueprint as well as core opti-
mizations that are beyond the state of the art.
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3.2 Acting upon Unanticipated Failures
In today’s software systems, the mainstream way to communicate and handle
failures is exception handling. In software design books, entire chapters are
dedicated to discussing good and bad practices on exception handling [5]. For
instance, the Hadoop distributed filesystem does most of its failure-handling
using exceptions through 9888 catch block. Briefly, classical exception han-
dling works as follows:
// failure detection
if (file==null) { // failure condition
throw new InputException();
}
// failure handling
catch (InputException) { // recovery condition
defaultText = "foo bar"; // recovery strategy
}
One sees the three main components of failure handling using exceptions:
1) the failure condition (here file==null) encodes a predicate on the system
state whose value encodes the presence of a failure; 2) the recovery condi-
tion states when a failure can be handled (here when an exception of type
InputException arrives at this location); 3) the recovery code repairs the
system state it is the content of the catch block (here defaultText = "foo
bar"). Today, all those three components are manually written and hard-
coded. This is a fundamental limitation.
In today’s open-ended systems, the kinds of failures and recovery are open-
ended. As said above, the Eclipse development environment runs on at least
5 millions different machines. Can the developer foresee all possible failures?
Can she hard-code all possible failure conditions, recovery conditions and re-
covery strategies? No.
I claim that that all those three components must become adaptable in-
stead of being manually hard coded, as shown in the following example:
// failure detection
if (failureDetected(file, user)) {
throw new InputException();
}
// failure handling
catch (failureRecoverable(exception, context)) {
recover(defaultText,output);
}
In this simplifying example, the main changes compared to the previous one
is that the failure detection condition becomes the result of the evaluation of
a function, so do the recovery condition and the recovery code. By replacing
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an hard-coded condition with a function evaluation, the failure-handling can
be become resourceful and capable of handling unanticipated failures. In this
context, the notion of “resourceful” is close to that of Abbott [1] and means
two things: first, resourceful failure-handling code can be changed at runtime
if previous evaluations failed to heal the system, second it can act upon an
arbitrary number variables of the system, incl. those that have not been fore-
seen by the developers. In the example, although the manually written failure
condition only involves variable “file”, the correct failure condition detection
may actually involve variable “user”. This point also holds for the recovery
condition and the recovery code since the developer cannot perfectly foresee
the variables required for recovery in all cases.
This vision poses a number of challenges. First, it must be non-conflicting
with the existing failure handling code (the recovery must gracefully augment
the 9888 existing catch blocks in the case of Hadoop). Second, it must work
in intimate collaboration with a monitoring system so as to reason on when
and how a resourceful algorithm must be run to synthesize a new failure con-
dition, recovery condition or recovery strategy. Third, it must be compatible
with existing compile-time and runtime support for exceptions (not all lan-
guages support parameterizing the catch exception by function evaluation as
described in our example).
One enabling solution is the introduction of runtime evaluation and first
class execution objects at all stages of the failure-handling process: first failure
recovery strategies can then be reused even in unanticipated cases (as opposed
to only triggered in the specified cases); second failure detection recovery can
be adapted: when recovery fails, alternative solutions in a recovery space are
explored, for instance by taking into account new portions of the system state
(new variables). Last but not least, the recovery itself can be seen declara-
tively: the call to recover(defaultText,output) searches for a solution to
a recovery problem, with a declarative specification of the recovery problem
(given a failure detection condition, a recovery condition and a necessary re-
covery post-condition).
I propose to consider recovery under three novel angles: recovery
should be the result of a synthesis problem; recovery should be a first-
class execution runtime object with full intercession capabilities; recovery
should become a search problem with alternative and competing solu-
tions.
Barriers: The main barrier for achieving resourceful recovry is semantics.
As shown in our empirical study [13], recovery uses the full range of pro-
gramming language constructs with rich and complex semantics. Also, the
diversity of failure conditions and recovery strategies may be too large for
keeping a complete record of all encountered failures and their solutions, so
as to ensure the automatic exploration of new portions of the search space.
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3.3 Constant Assessment of Recovery Capabilities with Injected
Perturbations
Once one has changed the perspective on software failures, once one considers
that software failures are an opportunity for the system to self-improve, this
opens radically new research directions. Today’s research devises systems that
are passive with respect to failures in production: they only handle failures
that “naturally” happen, where “naturally” means being triggered by an ex-
ternal and uncontrolled cause. I envision systems that proactively perturb the
execution with injected failures. The injected failures are carefully qualified
with respect to the expected recovery contracts. Let us consider a concrete
example.
According to our statistics on the Internet, the most common failures in
Java software are null dereferences (“null pointer exceptions”). Null deref-
erences cause desktop, server and mobile applications to crash on a daily
basis. Now, let’s consider a software system built using perturbationapplied
to null dereferences. The system embeds an advanced monitoring system as
described above, as well as resourceful recovery for null dereferences. As
such, the system has already overcome 15 unhandled null dereferences. Now,
the system is augmented with a module that selectively injects null values in
memory. This system would inject x (say 3) null values per day so as to 1)
assess that the system does not crash upon null dereferences, and 2) validate
synthesized recovery pro-actively.
On the hardware side of production systems, this idea is already applied.
For instance, datacenters are regularly subject to power cut so as to assess
whether the alternative sources of power are up and running. I propose to
explore this disruptive idea on the software side, to constantly assess whether
the embedded software recovery code well handles software failures.
This can be seen as an application of the scientific method to failure recov-
ery. The scientific method states that all hypotheses must be experimentally
validated using falsification experiments. A recovery capability is also an hy-
pothesis: if an event of type x happens, the system is able to survive. By
injecting an event x and assessing successful failure-recovery, one ensures the
truthfulness of the recovery hypothesis in production. In biology, “hormesis”
refers to the positive response of biological systems (e.g. a cell) in response
to a stressor. This can be seen as the exploration of the notion of hormesis in
the domain of software systems. Hormesis is close to antifragility [17] and to
this extent, this paper further explores the engineering of antifragile software
[12].
This is different and complementary from performing failure analysis in
testing phase. Failure analysis during testing enables to validate specific, well
formed, small failures. However, production systems are too big and too in-
terconnected to be reproduced in a controlled testing environment. This re-
sults in unanticipatable situations and behaviors. Failure injection in produc-
tion aims at tackling those unanticipatable, untestable failures that necessarily
happen in production.
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Software systems must become active with respect to software failures:
they must constantly assess their own recovery capabilities with failure
injection, they must constantly explore the recovery space based on the
injected failures. The injected failures are carefully controlled to both
maximize the knowledge gained from each injection and to mitigate their
impact and cost.
Barriers: This research direction has never been explored before. The
idea of injecting faults in production is fundamentally disturbing. We do not
know whether one can fully control the impact of injected faults, and whether
the benefits obtained with failure injection (better failure recovery; improved
knowledge) outperforms the losses (unfilled requests, unsatisfied users).
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I have sketched vision of software that learns to self-improve
from its own failures. To realize the vision, I set up a research agenda in three
points: devising the next-generation of collaborative and adaptive monitor-
ing systems, inventing a new generation of recovery based on code synthesis
and automated exploration of the recovery space, and characterizing failure
injection in production. The last point is radically new and very promising:
fault-injection in production is the only way to proactively assess the recovery
capabilities and to proactively explore the recovery space.
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